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1

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Article VIII, §3 of the Utah Constitution,
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended), and Rule 3(a),
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final Judgment dated April
6, 1988, and entered April 11, 1988, by the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, State
of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court err in concluding as a matter
of law that Valley1s prior security interest in the cement
mixer was junior and inferior to Plaintiffs1 claim of
ownership to the cement mixer?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs instituted this action against Defendants

for a determination that Plaintiffs1 claim to a 1978 International

cement mixer, ten yard, Cummins 230, serial no.

CF57HHA23465 (the "cement mixer"), prevails over Defendants'
interests in the cement mixer.

2.

Course of Proceedings
On October 27, 1987, Plaintiff's filed a Verified

Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Sixth Judicial
District Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, civil
no. 10140, requesting a determination that Plaintiffs own and
that Defendants have no interest in the cement mixer. (R. 1)
Valley Bank and Trust Company and Valley Central Bank (collectively referred to as "Valley") filed an Answer and
Counterclaim.

The Counterclaim alleged that Valley is

entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), for Plaintiffs1
failure to bring their action in good faith.

(R. 42)

Plaintiffs replied to Valleys' Counterclaim (R. 54) and the
parties began discovery proceedings.
On March 3, 1988, Valley filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment which was followed by a Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Plaintiffs on March 9, 1988.
177)

(R. 163,

After hearing both parties' Motions for Summary

Judgment, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs granted Plaintiffs1
motion and denied Valley's motion.

(R. 197)

On April 6,

1988, the court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, concluding that F. Creer has title to, and Valley has no
interest in, the cement mixer.

(R. 203; Addendum No. 1)
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Judgment against Valley was entered by the court on April 6,
1988 (R. 208) and on May 2, 1988, Valley filed a Notice of
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

(R. 212) Both parties

subsequently moved for summary disposition of the case, which
motions were denied by the court and the appeal was reserved
for plenary review.
3.

Statement of Facts
On April 22, 1982, Lays Rock Products, Inc.

("Lays"), executed and delivered to Valley a promissory note
("Note") in the principal sum of $250,000. (R. 204) As
security for the Note,

Lays executed and delivered to Valley

a security agreement granting Valley a security interest in
certain personal property, including the cement mixer, which
is the subject of this action.

(R. 204) Lays was the owner

and had possession of the cement mixer at the time the
security agreement was executed.

(R. 8)

Valley's security

interest attached to the cement mixer, but was not perfected.
(R. 167, 204) Lays was later merged into L.A. Young Sons
Construction Company ("L.A. Young"). (R. 167, 204)
Between approximately June, 1986, and March, 1987,
Plaintiff, John P. Creer ("J.P. Creer") performed legal
services for L.A. Young.

(R. 204) L.A. Young, however,
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failed to compensate J.P. Creer, for his legal services and
in March, 1987, J.P. Creer informed L.A. Young that he would
not continue legal representation unless L.A. Young paid J.P.
Creer's legal bill. (R. 205)

As a result, L.A. Young,

through its president, Alan G. Young, executed and delivered
to J.P. Creer a certificate of title to the cement mixer. (R.
205)

J.P. Creer later transferred title to the cement mixer

to his son, Plaintiff, Frank Creer ("F. Creer").

(R. 205)

There is nothing in the record to show that F. Creer gave any
consideration to J.P. Creer for the transfer of the title.
J.P. Creer transferred the vehicle to his son, F. Creer,
because J.P. Creer did not want an uninsured vehicle registered in his name.

(R. 134)

At the time he received title to the cement mixer,
J.P. Creer intended and understood that it was being transferred in partial satisfaction of L.A. Young's debt to J.P.
Creer for previously rendered legal services and that it was
not intended as security for that debt.

(R. 205)

J.P. Creer

never received delivery or had possession of the cement
mixer.

(R. 205)

F. Creer briefly obtained possession of the

cement mixer for a few minutes in September, 1987, without
the consent and against the will of the debtor's president,
Alan Young. (R. 181-182, 190-191)
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Creer relinquished posses-

sion of the cement mixer after being told by Alan Young that
if F. Creer took the vehicle there would be a serious altercation.

(R. 181-182, 190-191)

The cement mixer remained in

the possession of L.A. Young until Marcus Taylor, as receiver, took possession of it.

(R. 181, 191)

Neither J.P.

Creer nor F. Creer asserts a security interest in the cement
mixer, but rather base their claim to the cement mixer on an
ownership interest evidenced by the certificate of title. (R.
205)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I
Summary judgment is proper only where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In reviewing a

lower court's conclusions of law, the reviewing court examines the conclusions of law for correctness and is not
required to accord any deference to those conclusions.
Because the lower court's conclusions of law are incorrect,
Plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and the judgment against Valley should be reversed.
ARGUMENT II, POINT A
Section 70A-9-203, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security
interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties

when 1) there is a written security agreement; 2) the secured
party has given value for the security interest; and 3) the
debtor has rights in the collateral.

Because Valley has

complied with all three requirements, Valley's security
interest in the cement mixer attached, rendering Valley 1 s
security interest in the cement mixer valid and enforceable.
ARGUMENT II, POINT B
Section 70A-9-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is the sole provision
which addresses and resolves the relative priorities between
an unperfected security interest of the type held by Valley
and a claimed ownership interest of the type asserted by
Plaintiffs.

In order to prevail over an unperfected security

interest, §70A-9-301 requires that a party must be a buyer
and have received delivery of the collateral.

The fact that

the cement mixer was transferred to J.P. Creer in partial
satisfaction of a money debt owed to him by L.A. Young for
previously rendered legal services precludes Plaintiffs from
being buyers within the meaning of §70A-9-301.

Additionally,

J.P. Creer never had possession of the cement mixer and
neither J.P. Creer nor F. Creer ever received delivery of the
cement mixer. According to the terms of §70A-9-301, Valley's
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unperfected security interest is superior to Plaintiff's
claimed ownership interest in the cement mixer.
ARGUMENT III
Plaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that the perfection
of a security interest in a motor vehicle must be effectuated
in accordance with the Utah Motor Vehicle Act.

However/

Plaintiffs have failed to cite authority which addresses the
treatment of security interests which are unperfected as
against competing claims of ownership.

Essentially/ Plain-

tiffs argue that the perfection of a security interest is the
exclusive means by which a person may prevail against a
competing claim of ownership in a vehicle.

Plaintiffs'

contention is unfounded and constitutes a serious misunderstanding of Draper Bank and Trust Co. v. Lavsori/ 675 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1983).
ARGUMENT I
THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT REQUIRED
TO ACCORD ANY DEFERENCE TO THE
DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND REVIEWS THOSE CONCLUSIONS FOR
CORRECTNESS
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 56(c)/ Utah

Valley contends on appeal that the
- 7 -

lower court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that the lower court's conclusions of
law are incorrect so that Defendants were not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
It is a well settled principle of appellate review
that an appellate court is not required to accord any deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.

Wessel v.

Erickson Landscaping Co.; 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). This
court has consistently held that in reviewing a trial court's
legal conclusions/ the reviewing court examines the lower
court's legal conclusions for correctness.

Wessel, 711 P.2d

at 253; Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In this appeal, Valley accepts as true the factual
findings adopted by the district court.

Thus, Valley readily

endorses the crucial facts that L.A. Young granted Valley a
valid security interest in the cement mixer, that L.A. Young
transferred title to the cement mixer to J.P. Creer as
partial satisfaction of L.A. Young's obligation to J.P. Creer
for the payment of legal fees, and that J.P. Creer at no time
received delivery or had possession of the cement mixer.
Valley does, however, challenge the district court's
conclusions of law that 1) Valley's failure to perfect its
security interest in the cement mixer precludes it from
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prevailing over F. Creer's ownership claim to the cement
mixer; and that 2) F. Creer's claim to the cement mixer is
superior to Valley's unperfected security interest in the
cement mixer.

As explained below, the district court failed

to properly apply §70A-9-301(1) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code to determine the relative priority of each
parties' claim.

Because Plaintiffs were not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, the district court erred in
granting judgment against Valley and the judgment should be
reversed in favor of Valley.
ARGUMENT II
VALLEY HAS AN ENFORCEABLE SECURITY
INTEREST IN THE CEMENT MIXER WHICH
HAS PRIORITY OVER PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMED INTEREST
POINT A:

Valley's Security Interest in the Cement Mixer
Has Attached and is Enforceable Against J.P.
Creer and F. Creer.
Section 70A-9-203, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),

of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, provides that a security
interest in collateral is not enforceable against the debtor
or third parties unless three requirements are met.

First,

the debtor must have a signed, written security agreement.
§70A-9-203(a).

Second, a secured party must give value for

the security interest.

§70A-0-203(b).

_9-

Finally, the debtor

must have rights in the collateral.

§70A-9-203(c).

See,

Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1125
(Utah 1974) .
In the case at bar, all three requirements for
Valley's security interest to attach are met.

With regard to

the first requirement, Lays executed and delivered to Valley
a written security agreement granting Valley a security
interest in the cement mixer on October 28, 1983.

(R. 204)

In satisfaction of the second requirement, Valley gave value
for the security interest by extending a loan to Lays in the
sum of $250,000, as evidenced by the Note.

(R. 174, 204)

Finally, because Lays had title to and possession of the
cement mixer (R. 5 ) , Lays had acquired "rights" to the cement
mixer.

Having met all three conditions, Valley's security

interest in the cement mixer attached and became enforceable
against Lays and third parties such as J.P. Creer and F.
Creer.
The lower court failed to appreciate the significance of the attachment of a security interest in collateral.

The effect of the attachment of a security interest

in collateral is to establish the creditor's rights in the
collateral vis a vis the debtor, and in some instances, third
parties.

Outlining the three requirements necessary for a
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security interest to attach, §70A-9-203 provides that once
those three requirements have been met/ the security interest
attaches to the collateral and becomes enforceable against
the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral.
In the absence of a superior competing interest/ a security
interest which has attached to the collateral entitles the
creditor to the right to repossess the collateral upon
default of the underlying obligation, according to the
provisions of Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
Perfection, on the other hand, establishes a creditor's
rights in collateral in relation to other perfected security
interests and other third parties.
Recognizing that the holder of an unperfected
security interest has a valid and enforceable interest in the
collateral/ the question arises as to whether there are any
circumstances under which an unperfected security-interest
holder has priority over other interests in the collateral.
That inquiry is answered by §70A-9-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended), of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

Section

70A-9-301 is the sole provision which addresses and resolves
the relative priorities between an unperfected security
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interest of the type held by Valley and the owner of goods of
the type asserted by Plaintiffs.1
POINT B:

Under §70A-9-301(1)(c) of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, Valley f s Security Interest in the
Cement Mixer is Superior to Plaintiffs1 Ownership
Claim Because Plaintiffs are not "Buyers" and Have
not "Received Delivery of the Collateral".
Section 70A-9-301 , Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

enumerates various categories of persons who are deemed to
take priority over persons with unperfected security interests.

That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (2), an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of
(c) in the case of goods . . . a person
who is not a secured party and who is a .
• • buyer not in the ordinary course of
business . . . to the extent he gives
value and receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is
perfected. . .

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff's claim of ownership interest to

the cement mixer has priority over Valley's unperfected se-

The Utah Motor Vehicle Act contains no provisions which
address the competing interests of a party with an
unperfected security interest in a vehicle and a party
with a claimed ownership interest, who is not a buyer of
the vehicle and who has not received delivery or possession of the vehicle.
- 12 -

curity interest only if they can establish that they have met
all the requirements of §70A-9-301.

Plaintiffs clearly have

not satisfied the requirements of being a "buyer" and of
having "received delivery of the collateral."
Defining "buyer in the ordinary course of business/"
§70A-1-201(9) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides
that "![b]uyingf . . . does not include a transfer through or
in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt."

See

Walter E. Heller Western/ Inc. v. Bohemia, Inc./ 61 Or. App.
57, 655 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1972).

Applying this definition to

the facts of this case/ J.P. Creer was clearly not a "buyer"
of the cement mixer.

The lower court's findings of fact

state that:
[a]t the time he received the title to the
cement mixer, J.P. Creer intended and
understood that it was being transferred
to him in partial satisfaction of L.A.
Young's obligation to pay legal fees. . .
(R. 205)

Throughout this litigation, J.P. Creer has admit-

ted that L.A. Young owed him a money debt for previously
rendered legal services and that title to the cement mixer
was transferred to him in partial satisfaction of that debt.
(R. 3, 145/ 205)
In addition to not being "buyers" within the meaning
of §70A-9-301/ Plaintiffs also did not "receive delivery of
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the collateral," as required by §70A-9-301.

See, Federal

Insurance Deposit Corp, v. Yates, 719 S.W.2d 481, 484-485
(Mo. App. 1986).

As indicated in the lower court's findings

of fact, J.P. Creer has at no time received delivery or had
possession of the cement mixer.

(R. 205)

In September,

1987, F. Creer briefly obtained possession of the cement
mixer for a few minutes without the consent and against the
will of an officer of the debtor, Alan Young.
190-191)

(R. 181-182,

F. Creer relinquished his possession of the cement

mixer after being told by Alan Young that if F. Creer took
the vehicle, there would be a serious altercation.
181-182, 190-191)

(R.

F. Creer 1 s momentary possession of the

cement mixer clearly does not constitute a delivery by L.A.
Young of the cement mixer to J.P. Creer.

Because Plaintiffs

are not "buyers" and because J.P. Creer did not "receive
delivery" of the cement mixer, Plaintiffs cannot prevail
against Valley's enforceable security interest in the cement
mixer.
Valley's security interest in the cement mixer
attached to the cement mixer and became enforceable against
the debtor, L.A. Young.

The priority of that security

interest in relation to a claimed ownership interest, such as
Plaintiffs', is resolved by §70A-9-301.
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Because that section

dictates that Valley's interest is superior to Plaintiffs'/
the lower court erred in granting Plaintiffs' summary judgment as a matter of law and the judgment should be reversed
in favor of Valley.
ARGDMENT III
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH MOTOR
VEHICLE CODE ARE ABSOLUTELY IRRELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE
PRIORITY OF VALLEY'S AND PLAINTIFFS' COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE
CEMENT MIXER
Plaintiffs' position in this case is that the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable because the facts
involve a motor vehicle.

(Response to Appellants' Motion for

Reversal of Judgment, filed June 8, 1988, p. 1)

Plaintiffs

assert instead that the provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle
Act exclusively govern the parties' competing claims to the
cement mixer and entitle Plaintiffs' to a prior right to the
cement mixer.

(R. 182)

Plaintiffs cite absolutely no

authority for either contention.
Plaintiffs have repeatedly asserted in the trial
court and on appeal the rule that the perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle must be effectuated in
accordance with the Utah Motor Vehicle Act.

Valley does not

dispute this principle and concedes/ as it has throughout the
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course of this litigation, that it did not perfect its security interest in the cement mixer.
Plaintiffs' discussion of the method by which a
security interest in a vehicle must be perfected demonstrates
Plaintiffs' lack of understanding of the distinction between
the method of perfecting a security interest in motor vehicles and the procedure to determine the priority of an
unperfected security interest in a vehicle and a claimed
ownership interest of a person who has not received delivery
or possession of the vehicle and whose interest was obtained
as payment of an antecedent debt.
Essentially, Plaintiffs1 argue that the

perfection

of a security interest under the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is
the exclusive means by which a person may prevail against a
competing claim of ownership in a vehicle.

Plaintiffs appear

to base their argument on their understanding of this court's
decision in Draper Bank and Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1983).

Draper Bank stands for the proposition

that the Utah Motor Vehicle Act provides the exclusive means
to perfect the security interest in vehicles.
675 P.2d at 1177.

Draper Bank,

It does not state or suggest that the

perfection of a security interest in a vehicle is determinative of the priority of competing claims to a vehicle.
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Plaintiffs construe Draper Bank far beyond its stated holding
to mean that unless a person's security interest in a vehicle
is perfected under the Motor Vehicle Act, that person loses
all interest in the vehicle, regardless of the strength of
competing claims to the vehicle.

According to Plaintiff's

view, a person who has given no value for the vehicle, who
has actual knowledge of the pre-existing security interest,
and who has never had possession or delivery of the vehicle,
has a superior interest in the vehicle to the person who has
a valid and enforceable, but unperfected security interest.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assumption, failing to
perfect a security interest does not extinguish the security
interest and the rights associated with it.
continue to exist.

Those rights

Where one of two competing claims is an

unperfected security interest, the resolution of those claims
is governed by §70A-9-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code.

When that section is properly applied, Valley is

entitled to judgment against Plaintiffs as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's conclusions of law are incorrect.
According to §70A-9-203, Valley acquired a valid and enforceable security interest which attached to the cement
mixer.

Section 70A-9-301 is the exclusive provision which
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addresses competing claims of holders of unperfected security
interests and ownership claims of persons who are not secured
parties, such as Plaintiffs.

In order for Plaintiffs'

claimed ownership interest to prevail over Valley's attached,
but unperfected security interest, Plaintiffs must satisfy
each of the requirements set forth in §70A-9-301(1)(c).
Because Plaintiffs are not buyers and have not received
delivery of the collateral, Plaintiffs' claim to the cement
mixer is inferior to Valley's.

Section 70A-9-301 therefore

dictates as a matter of law that Valley's interest in the
cement mixer is superior to Plaintiffs' claimed interest.
Because Plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, Valley respectfully requests that this court reverse
the lower court's judgment and grant judgment in favor of
Valley, together with Valley's attorney's fees and the costs
of the appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August,
1988.
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their counsel, John T. Anderson of

Defendant, Marcus

Taylor,

appeared and

represented himself pro se.
The

court

representations and

having heard and considered
stipulations of counsel,

announced its decision to grant

plaintiff's

the arguments,
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having orally

motion for summary

judgment and deny defendants' motion for summary judgment, hereby
makes and

enters its findings

of fact and conclusions of law as

follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
("Lays"), a
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On

April

corporation

22, 1982, Lays

Rock

Products, Inc.

which was later merged into L. A. Young

Construction Company ("L.A. Young"), executed and delivered
Valley a

promissory note

("Note") in

the principal

sum of

$250,000.00.
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As security

1983, granted to

for the Note, Lays,

on October

Valley a security interest in certain

property including an

International cement

22,

personal

mixer, Cummins 230,

Serial No. CF257HHA23465 (the "Cement Mixer").
3.
the Cement

Valley never perfected

Mixer by

its security

interest

in

complying with the requirements of the Utah

Motor Vehicle Code.
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performed
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John

Preston

for L.

1986, and March, 1987.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendants'

failure

to

perfect

their

security

interest in the Cement Mixer in accordance with the provisions of
Sections

41-1-80-87f

precludes them from

Utah

Code

Annotated

(1953

as

amended)

asserting their priority in the Cement Mixer

as against the claim of ownership of plaintiffs.
2.

Plaintiffs'

Cement Mixer is superior

claim

of

ownership

(p

and to

the

to the unperfected security interest of

defendants in the Cement Mixer.
DATED this

in

day of April, 1988.
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NOW,

THEREFORE,

IT

IS ' HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED as follows:
1.
the

1978

That the

plaintiff Frank Moyle Creer has title to

International

257HHA23465) and

cement

mixer

truck

that the defendants, Valley

(I.D. VIN-CF

Central

Bank

Valley Bank & Trust Company have no interest in said truck.
DATED this

<g

day of April, 1988.
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